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Introduction
Article I of the Constitution places the power of the purse in the
hands of Congress: "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.... ." Congress's power
to appropriate - or fail to appropriate - money for the operations of
* J.D., Northwestern University, 1992; B.A., Brown University, 1987. The author
would like to thank Professor Thomas W. Merrill for his insightful comments on an earlier
draft of this Article.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
7.
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the other two branches of the government is one of its most potent weapons. It has been described as "the most important single curb in the
Constitution on Presidential Power,"2 and as being "at the foundation of
our constitutional order." 3 Yet there has been surprisingly little scholarly discourse on the contours of this power.4 In particular, there has
been little discussion of the limitations rider - a method Congress has
used to an increasing degree in recent years to control the activities of the
executive branch. This Article investigates possible separation-of-powers
limitations on the legislature's ability to effectuate substantive policy
changes through limitation riders on appropriations bills.
Part I presents some historical background on the Appropriations
Clause, describes the types of policy objectives Congress has sought to
promote through the use of appropriations riders, and surveys the few
scholarly contributions to the field. Part II presents a more detailed
analysis of the implications of appropriations riders in several areas. It
argues that although there is no overriding constitutional prohibition on
the use of appropriations riders to establish policy directives, those riders
are subject to the same constitutional limitations as are other kinds of
legislation, and the riders often violate specific constitutional provisions.
Part III examines situations in which Congress attempts to interfere directly with executive functions concerning prosecutorial discretion, and
argues that these appropriations riders must not interfere with the President's duty to uphold the law. Part IV analyzes riders attached to bills
appropriating funds for the conduct of foreign relations, and suggests
that Congress may not attempt to prescribe activities in areas the President is better suited to analyze. Part V discusses how courts should enforce the constitutional limitations. It suggests that Congress should
avoid using appropriations riders to enact substantive legislation, and
that, when Congress does attach impermissible riders to appropriations
bills, the President should refuse to abide by them.
I.

Historical Background and Recent Commentary

Perhaps more perfectly than any other provision in the Constitution, the Appropriations Clause embodies the notion of the separation of
powers. The Clause "reflects the ideal of Adams, Hamilton, and other
2. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 101 (13th
ed. 1975).
3. Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1344 (1988).
4. Id. Some recent works which address the issue are J. Gregory Sidak, The President's
Powerof the Purse, 1989 DUKE LJ.1162; Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies

Through Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456; Louis Fisher, How Tightly Can Congress

Draw the Purse Strings?, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 758 (1989).
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Framers that, through the rule of law, the arbitrariness of government
action can be restrained." ' An additional concern of the Framers was
the separation of the power to wage war from the power to fund it.
Thus, the Commander in Chief of the armed forces was made dependent
on the legislature. 6 Comparing the American system of government to
that of the British, Jefferson stated that the United States Constitution
shifted the war power "from the executive to the legislative body, from
those who are to spend to those who are to pay." 7 Madison voiced similar sentiments:
Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be
proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded. They are barred from the latter functions by
a great principle in free government, analogous to that which separates the sword from the purse, or the power of executing from the
power of enacting laws.$
Finally, the Framers hoped that, by placing the power to levy taxes and
appropriate money squarely with Congress, they could forestall the civil
strife engendered in Britain by the ambiguous placement of that power.9
The Appropriations Clause grants to Congress an awesome power
over the other branches of government. It can be used as a shield and as
a sword, resisting unwelcome intrusions by the other branches and enabling forays into their territory. Madison captured the double-edged
essence of this power when he wrote:
The House of Representatives alone can propose the supplies requisite for the support of government. They, in a word, hold the
purse - that powerful instrument by which we behold, in the history of the British Constitution, an infant and humble representation of the people gradually enlarging the sphere of its activity and
importance, and finally reducing, as far as it seems to have wished,
all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government. This power of the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the
most compleat and effectual weapon with which any constitution
can arm the immediate representatives of the people for obtaining a
redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just
and salutary measure.10
The Framers foresaw some of the potential problems that might
arise from the placement of the power of the purse exclusively within the
5. Sidak, supra note 4, at 1167.
6. Fisher, supra note 4, at 762.
7. 5 THE WRITNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 123 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1895).
8. 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 148 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).

9. Although the power to levy taxes was nominally placed with Parliament, English
Kings had long relied on extraparliamentary sources of revenue. Fisher, supra note 4, at 761.
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 394 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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domain of Congress. Curiously, several of the Framers even envisioned
the practice, which was to emerge only much later, of using indispensable
"money bills" as a means of forcing the Senate and the Executive to accept otherwise objectionable substantive legislation. George Mason of
Virginia, who ultimately refused to sign the Constitution,"1 predicted
that the House would adopt "the practice of tacking foreign matter to
money bills."1 2 James Wilson of Pennsylvania warned that "the House
of [Representatives] will insert other things in money bills, and by making them conditions of each other, destroy the deliberative liberty of the
Senate." 13 Although the debate appears to have been concerned primarily with the power to raise revenue rather than with the power to spend, 4
15
the same concerns apply to both.
Despite these premonitions, the Framers could not possibly have envisioned the position appropriations riders occupy today. Although Congress has been attaching limitation riders to appropriations bills since at
least 1878,16 in recent years Congress has made increasing use of limitation riders in order to effectuate substantive policy changes.1 7 For example, between 1963 and 1977, Congress proposed 341 such riders."
Throughout history Congress has used limitation riders to advance
a bewildering array of policy objectives. For example, Congress has used
appropriations riders to deprive former slaves of the right to vote,19 to
protect farm subsidies from executive scrutiny, ° to prevent the President
from making recess appointments,2" to enter into the conduct of negotiations with foreign powers, 2 and to remove suspected Communists from
11. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
659 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1966) (1840).
12. Id. at 443.
13. d at 444.
14. Sidak, supra note 4, at 1172.
15. A government, in order to operate, must both raise money and spend it, a process to
which both taxing and appropriations measures are indispensable. Accordingly, the practice
of inserting objectionable material into appropriations bills raises concerns identical to those
implicated when similar material is inserted into tax bills. Both situations work a sort of extortion on the executive branch.
16. See EDWARD C. MASON, THE VETO POWER: ITS ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT AND
FUNCTION IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1789-1889), at 47-49 (Albert B.

Hart ed., Russell & Russell 1967) (1890) (describing rider attached to the Army appropriations bill of 1878 prohibiting the presence of Army personnel at the polls).
17. Devins, supra note 4, at 456.
18. Id. at 462.
19. See infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 161-68 and accompanying text.
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the federal payroll.
Few scholars have analyzed whether there are constitutional limitations on Congress's ability to effectuate substantive policy changes
through the use of appropriations riders. Professor Neal E. Devins
touches on this issue in his article, Regulation of Government Agencies
Through Limitation Riders. 4 Devins argues that appropriations riders
are inappropriate vehicles for the advancement of congressional views
regarding substantive policy changes.25 He suggests that the appropriations process in general, and the way limitation riders are attached to
bills in particular, are not conducive to sound policymaking.26 Finally,
Devins argues that the ephemeral nature of appropriations bills makes it
difficult for both the executive and judicial branches to interpret the
27
law.
Louis Fisher's article, How Tightly Can Congress Draw the Purse
Strings?,28 addresses the expansive notion of the executive appropriations
power advocated by the Reagan Administration during the Iran-Contra
hearings. 29 In particular, Fisher disputes the administration's contention
that it had the right to expend in any way funds raised in the peculiar
manner involved.3 0 Fisher concludes that both constitutional limitations
and political concerns would have allowed Congress to prevent the Executive from obtaining and expending funds through improper channels.3 1
Professor Kate Stith3 2 and J. Gregory Sidak3 3 have contributed a
spirited debate over an implied presidential power to spend. In her article Congress'Powerof the Purse,3 4 Professor Stith develops the dual theories of the "Principle of the Public Fisc" and the "Principle of
Appropriations Control."' 35 Through these two theories, Stith proposes
23. See infra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.

24. Devins, supra note 4, at 456. Professor Devins is Assistant Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary; Research Fellow, Institute of Bill of
Rights Law, College of William and Mary.

25. Id at 457-58.
26. Id at 458.
27. Id
28. Fisher, supra note 4. Louis Fisher is Senior Specialist, Congressional Research Ser-

vice, Library of Congress.
29. Id
30. Id.
31. Id at 765.
32. Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
33. Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.
34. Stith, supra note 3.
35. Id at 1345. The Principle of the Public Fisc asserts that "all monies received from
whatever source by any part of the government are public funds," and the Principle of Appropriations Control prohibits the "expenditure of any public, money without legislative
authorization."
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that the executive branch during the Iran-Contra affair was without authority to obtain and expend money not specifically allocated by Congress, and further, that were Congress not to fund constitutionally
mandated executive activities, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary
would be in a position to remedy the situation.3 6 In his article The President's Power of the Purse,3 7 Mr. Sidak argues that Professor Stith's theory would "swallow[ ] the principle of the separation of powers." 38 Mr.
Sidak advances a theory of implied executive spending power which allows the Executive to function even when Congress has failed to appropriate money to fund constitutionally mandated activities, 39 a
classification that Mr. Sidak interprets much more broadly than does
Professor Stith.'

I.

Specific Constitutional Limitations

A. Introduction
The Constitution does not distinguish appropriations from other
legislation. Nor, as Louis Fisher has noted, does it make any mention of
appropriations committees. 4 Indeed, prior to the Civil War, both the
House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee
handled both revenue and expenditure bills.42 As a consequence, there is
no general constitutional limitation on the types of policy objectives that
may be promoted through the use of appropriations bills, much less a
specific constitutional stricture regarding limitation riders on those bills.
Limitation riders on appropriations bills are therefore subject to the same
constitutional prohibitions that circumscribe all legislation.
This conclusion, simple though it may seem, eludes Congress now
and then. Congress may not do in an appropriations rider what it is
36. Id at 1345-53.
37. Sidak, supra note 4.
38. Id at 1164.
39. Sidak argues that where Congress has denied funding for a "textually demonstrable
duty or prerogative of the President," the President has implied authority to create a source of
funds sufficient to enable the President to execute that duty or prerogative. Id at 1201.
40. Professor Stith divides the President's duties into indispensable and incidental duties,
placing the duty to execute treaties and statutes in the latter category, where they are subject to
complete congressional control. Stith, supra note 3, at 1352 & n.38. Mr. Sidak, on the other
hand, would place the President's duty to execute the law, as well as the executive prerogatives, squarely within the realm of executive functions with the exercise of which Congress is
not permitted to interfere. Sidak, supra note 4, at 1163-64.
41. Louis FISHER, THE AUTHORIZATION-APPROPRIATION PROCESS: FORMAL RULES
AND INFORMAL PRACTICES 3 (Congressional Research Service No. 79-161, 1979).
42. Id

Winter 19921

APPROPRIATIONS RIDERS

prohibited from doing through other means.4 3 It could not, for example,
use an appropriations rider to enact a bill of attainder or ex post facto
law,' to reduce the salaries of the President or of federal judges,4' or to
grant a title of nobility.' Scholars who have discussed the issue generally agree that Congress may not utilize its appropriations power to accomplish these forbidden ends. For example, both Fisher and Stith agree
that "Congress would overstep its boundaries if it 'refused to appropriate
funds for the President to receive foreign ambassadors or to make trea-

ties.' "I4 Fisher continues, "It is conventional to say that Congress, in
adding conditions and provisos to appropriations bills, may not achieve
'48
unconstitutional results."

The Constitution contemplates three types of executive activity: immutable duties, prerogatives, and mutable duties.49 Immutable duties are
those explicitly mandated by the Constitution. These include the duties
to nominate and to appoint, 0 the duties to deliver a State of the Union
address and to make recommendations, 5 the duty to receive ambassadors,5 2 and the duty to commission federal officers.5 3 Prerogatives include those activities in which the President may constitutionally engage,
and encompass the ability to pardon, 4 the ability to make treaties, 55 and
43. "Congress may not use its powers over appropriations to attain indirectly an object
which it could not have accomplished directly." 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 507, 526 (1960) (statement
of Attorney General William P. Rogers).
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed.").
45. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 ("The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his
Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period
for which he shall have been eeted .... "); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges, both of the
supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at
stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during
their Continuance in Office.").
46. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 ("No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United
States. .. ").
47. Fisher, supra note 4, at 762 (quoting Stith, supra note 3, at 1351).
48. Id.
49. Cf. Sidak, supra note 4, at 1183 (recognizing two types of executive responsibilities).
50. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[the President] shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law
51. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 3 ("[The President] shall from time to time give to the Congress
Information on the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures
as he shall judge necessary and expedient .... ").
52. Id ("[The President] shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers. . .
53. I'd ("[The President] shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.").
54. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. I ("[The President] shall have Power to grant Reprieves
and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.").
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the ability to make recess appointments.5 6 There is only one mutable
duty: the duty to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.5 7 This duty
is mutable because the laws themselves change.
Congress has a duty to fund those executive functions related to immutable duties. For example, Stith concedes that "Congress is obliged to
provide public funds for constitutionally mandated activities-both obligations imposed upon the government generally and independent constitutional activities of the President.""8 Similarly, Sidak has observed that
"[i]mplicit in the Constitution's assignment of duties to the President
under article II must have been the expectation on the Framers' part that
Congress would appropriate at least the minimum amount necessary for
the President to perform those duties." 59
Congress also has a duty to fund those executive activities related to
prerogatives. Such a construction is the only reasonable one, for a grant
of power to the President would be meaningless if Congress could deny
the President the funds necessary to execute that power. Sidak notes,
"The power to negotiate treaties, for example, would be reduced to the
precatory statement that it would be nice if the President could negotiate
treaties now and then."'
There is little consensus, however, concerning a congressional duty
to fund that executive function which relates to a mutable duty - the
duty to execute the laws. One line of reasoning suggests that, in attempting to control the implementation of the substantive legislation through
the use of appropriations riders, Congress may prevent the executive
branch from carrying out its constitutional mandate faithfully to execute
the laws. One writer has observed, for example, that "[ilf the power to
execute the laws means anything, it is that neither Congress nor individual congressmen may interfere with the executive decisions of administrative agencies as to how they interpret laws already in force."'"
55. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur .... ").
56. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
3 (CThePresident shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies
that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire
at the End of their next Session.").
57. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.
").
58. Stith, supra note 3, at 1350-51 (footnote omitted).
59. Sidak, supra note 4, at 1185.
60. Id. at 1189.
61. Archie Parnell, CongressionalInterference in Agency Enforcement: The IRS Experience, 89 YALE L.J. 1360, 1379 (1980). Mr. Parnell is Senior Staff Counsel to the Ways and
Means Oversight Committee of the House of Representatives.
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Another line of reasoning suggests that it is perfectly legitimate for
Congress to use limitation riders on appropriations bills to restrict the
Executive's ability to implement policies that it deems unsound. Under
this view, the argument that Congress is without the power to prescribe
policy through the use of appropriations riders "is based on the remarkable and unfounded proposition that article II provides the Executive plenary power to shape the implementation of substantive legislative
authorizations. Limitation riders are as much an act of Congress as are
authorizations. 6 2
Part III discusses congressional ability to deny funds for activities
related to the Executive's duty to execute the laws. This Part presents a
survey of situations in which Congress has attempted to limit the exercise
of those executive functions related to immutable duties and executive
prerogatives. Each example represents an attempt by Congress to avoid
specific constitutional prohibitions through the use of appropriations riders. An analysis of congressional attempts to direct the Executive's foreign policy is reserved for Part IV.
B. The Recommendations Clause
The Recommendations Clause provides that the President shall
"recommend to [Congress's] Consideration such Measures as he shall
judge necessary and expedient .... 6 3 Yet Congress from time to time
attaches to appropriations bills riders that have the effect of denying the
President the power to make recommendations.
Just why Congress would want to do this is a mystery. Perhaps
Congress is attempting to maintain an asymmetry of information between the Executive and Congress. In other words, certain members of
Congress may fear that if the true policy implications of a course of action proposed by the Executive were made known to a majority of the
Congress, that majority would support such a change. In any event,
Congress frequently attempts to deprive the executive branch of its
power to make recommendations. Many commentators and politicians
feel these measures are blatantly unconstitutional.
An example of Congress's failure to fund a constitutionally mandated executive function is contained in the Departments of Commerce,
Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act of 1990. 61 Embedded deep in the middle of section 608 of that Act is
a provision stipulating that
62. Devins, supra note 4, at 472.
63. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
64. Pub. L. No. 101-162, 103 Stat. 988 (1989).
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none of the funds appropriated under this Act or under any prior
Acts for the Legal Services Corporation shall be used to consider,
develop, or implement any system for the competitive award of
grants or contracts until such action is authorized pursuant to a
majority vote of a Board of Directors of the Legal Services Corporation composed of eleven individuals nominated by the President
after January 20, 1989,
and subsequently confirmed by the United
5
States Senate .... 6
This provision can be interpreted either as a limitation on the President's
power to make recess appointments, or as a limitation on the Executive's
power to make recommendations. Because consideration of a policy
change is a necessary prerequisite to proposing that change to the legislative branch, a prohibition against such consideration is the functional
equivalent of a denial of the power to recommend.
Such "muzzling" provisions appear with some regularity in acts appropriating funds for the maintenance of a federal system for the production and distribution of electricity. For example, the Energy and Water
Development Appropriations Act of 1990,66 which provided funds for
the Department of Energy, contained such a provision. Section 506 prohibits the use of funds "for the purposes of conducting any studies relating or leading to the possibility of changing from the currently required
'at cost' to a 'market rate' or any other noncost-based method for the
pricing of hydroelectric power by the six Federal public power
authorities."'67
The Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Act of 19868 contained a
similar provision. Section 208 prohibited the federal government from
soliciting or studying any proposals to sell the Tennessee Valley Authority or the Federal Power Marketing Administrations without specific
congressional authorization. That section provided that
no funds appropriated or made available under this or any other
Act shall be used by the executive branch for soliciting proposals,
preparing or reviewing studies or drafting proposals designed to
transfer out of Federal ownership, management or control in whole
or in part the facilities and functions of the Federal power marketing administrations located within the contiguous 48 States, and
the Tennessee Valley Authority, until such activities have been specifically authorized and in accordance with terms and conditions
established by an Act of Congress hereafter enacted.6 9
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. § 608, 103 Stat. at 1036.
Pub. L. No. 101-101, 103 Stat. 641 (1989).
Id § 506, 103 Stat. at 666.
Pub. L. No. 99-349, 100 Stat. 710 (1986).
Id § 208, 100 Stat. at 749.
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These provisions represent blatant attempts by Congress to interfere
with the recommendation power. President Reagan, in signing the Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1986, correctly declared section 208 to be an "unreasonable restriction on the executive branch."7 0
Perhaps the most extreme example of Congress's attempts to silence
the executive branch concerns farm subsidies. In 1981, President Reagan, concerned about agency regulations that benefitted special interest
groups at the expense of taxpayers or consumers, issued Executive Order
No. 12291,71 which directs the Office of Management and Budget to review proposed regulations in order to determine whether they "are able
to pass a simple cost-benefit test."'72 In response, Congress each year uses
an appropriations rider to ensure that farm subsidies cannot be subjected
to such scrutiny. 73 For example, a provision of the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 199074 provides
that "none of the funds appropriated in this Act for the Office of Management and Budget may be used for the purpose of reviewing any agricultural marketing orders or any activities or regulations under the
provisions of the Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (7
75
U.S.C. [§] 601 et seq.)."
C. The Recess Appointments Clause
The Recess Appointments Clause provides that "the President shall
have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of
the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of
their next Session."' 76 Occasionally, Congress has attempted to interfere
with the President's ability to make these appointments. The Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 199077 contains one example of congressional
interference with the recess appointments power. As noted above, 78 section 608 of that Act, 79 which prohibits certain activities of the Legal
Services Corporation until its Board of Directors has been confirmed by
the Senate, can be interpreted as a limitation on the power of recess ap70. Statement on Signing the Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1986 PUB. PAPERS 1906 (July 2, 1986).
71. 46 Fed. Reg. 13, 193 (1981).
72. Sidak, supra note 4, at 1210.
73. Id.
74. Pub. L. No. 101-136, 103 Stat. 783 (1989).
75. Id § 105, 103 Stat. at 792-93.
76. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
77. Pub. L. No. 101-162, 103 Stat. 988 (1989).
78. Pub. L. No. 101-162, § 608, 103 Stat. 988, 1032 (1989).
79. See supra text accompanying note 65.
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pointees. It therefore can be interpreted as a limitation on the power of
the President to make those appointments. President Bush criticized the
provision on these grounds when he signed the bill into law.80
Another example of congressional limitation on the President's recess appointments power is contained in the 1990 Appropriations Act for
the Executive Office of the President. 8' Section 606 of that Act provides:
No part of any appropriation for the current fiscal year contained
in this or any other Act shall be paid to any person for the filling of
any position for which he or she has been nominated after the Senate has voted not to approve the nomination of said person. 2
This provision is patently unconstitutional. The Recess Appointments
Clause does not condition the power on congressional approval; it is precisely because such approval is not necessary that the Clause provides
that the commissions of recess appointees will expire at the end of the
next session of Congress. Congress may not be enthralled with the prospect of having to live with an appointee whom it once rejected, but it is
not free to rewrite the Constitution to prevent it.83
D. The Bicameralism Requirement and the Presentment Clause
The Constitution provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall
consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." 84 The Presentment
Clause provides that "[e]very Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be
85
presented to the President of the United States .... "'
The Constitution
further provides that
[elvery Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of
the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary...
shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before
the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and
House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations
80. Statement on Signing the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary,
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1990, at 1989 PUB. PAPERS 1570 (Nov. 21, 1989)
("This section might have been read as an attempt to limit the powers exercised by future
recess appointees who lack Senate confirmation.").
81. Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-136, 103 Stat. 783 (1989).
82. Id. § 606, 103 Stat. at 817.
83. See Sidak, supra note 4, at 1208 ("This provision appears to be an attempt by Congress to use its appropriations power to prevent the President from freely exercising his prerogative to make recess appointments of politically controversial persons.").
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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prescribed in the Case of a Bill. 6
Until 1983, these provisions were thought to provide no bar to the
use of the so-called legislative veto. Legislative vetoes allowed Congress,
pursuant to a resolution adopted by one or both Houses, to invalidate
actions taken by the executive branch. But in the 1983 landmark case
INS v. Chadha,s7 the Supreme Court invalidated on constitutional
grounds a section of the Immigration and Nationality Act 8 that provided for a legislative veto mechanism. In doing so, the Court
"sound[ed] the death knell for nearly 200 other statutory provisions in
which Congress has reserved a 'legislative veto.' "89 Despite the Court's
ruling in Chadha, Congress still attaches riders to appropriations bills
which purport to condition the expenditure of funds allocated for certain
activities on the approval of Congress or, in particularly egregious violations, on the approval of a particular congressional committee.90
Several appropriations bills that have been passed in recent years
have conditioned, on the approval of various committees in both Houses,
the authority of the executive branch to spend otherwise allocated
money. The Department of Housing and Urban Development - Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 198591 contained several such
provisions. The Act authorized appropriations for several independent
agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency, the Veterans
Administration, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Seven sections of the Act prohibit the expenditure of appropriated
funds on certain activities unless the particular projects received the approval of the Committees on Appropriations of both the House and the
Senate. 92
Many other bills contain similar restrictions. Numerous provisions
of the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations
Act, Fiscal Year 1990,93 condition executive action on the approval of
various legislative committees. 4 In addition, the Department of the In86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
87. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
88. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1976).

89. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967 (White, J., dissenting).
90. Of course, the existence of these riders in the post-Chadha era could be due to the fact
that Congress has never gotten around to removing them from bills that pass every year in
essentially identical form.
91. Pub. L. No. 98-371, 98 Stat. 1213 (1984).
92. See Statement on Signing the Department of Housing and Urban Development Independent Agencies Act, 1985, at 1984 PUB. PAVERS 1056 (July 18, 1984).
93. Pub. L. No. 101-136, 103 Stat. 783 (1989).
94. See Statement on Signing the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act, 1990, at 1989 PuB. PAPERs 1448 (Nov. 3, 1989).
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terior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1989, 91
contains provisions requiring the approval of congressional committees
for (1) changes in Forest Service regional boundaries, or movement or
closure of regional offices, (2) changes in the Forest Service appropriations structure, (3) reduction of personnel in the Indian Health Service,
and (4) assessments against certain programs or activities. 6
Finally, Congress has recently announced in appropriations riders
that no funds may be used to engage in any activity of which it does not
approve. Congress has recently enacted numerous funding bills that contain the following clause: "No part of any appropriation contained in
this Act shall be available to implement, administer, or enforce any regulation which has been disapproved pursuant to a resolution of disapproval duly adopted in accordance with the applicable law of the United
States."9 7
This provision, and every appropriations bill that contains it, violates the Court's ruling in Chadha. Resolutions of disapproval, which
are not subject to the bicameralism and presentment requirements, are
precisely the types of congressional action that the Court ruled must be
denied the force of law. This objection was echoed by President Reagan,
who pointed out that, "[u]nder the Constitution and [Chadha],the 'resolution of disapproval' referred to in section 413 must be a joint resolution
presented to the President for approval or disapproval.""8
E. The Fifteenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause
The Guarantee Clause of the Constitution provides that "[t]he
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government...." 9 9 The Fifteenth Amendment, passed in 1869
and the last of the reconstruction amendments, provides that "[t]he right
of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude." 1" During Reconstruction, these two provisions
provided a basis for the presence of federal troops in Louisiana as a posse
95. Pub. L. No. 100-446, 102 Stat. 1774 (1988).
96. See Statement on Signing the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1989, at 1988 PUB. PAPERS 1228 (Sept. 27, 1988).
97. See, eg., Department of Housing and Urban Development - Independent Agencies
Appropriations Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-160, § 413, 99 Stat. 909, 931 (1985); Departments

of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of
1985, Pub. L. No. 98-411, § 505, 98 Stat. 1545, 1573 (1984).
98. Statement on Signing the Department of Housing and Urban Development - Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1986, at 1985 PUB. PAPER

99. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
100. U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, § 1.

1419 (Nov. 25, 1985).
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comitatus to prevent violence at the polls on election day. 10 1 After Reconstruction, however, congressional support for such measures dwindled, and President Hayes, who was committed to upholding the
Fifteenth Amendment through whatever means necessary, became embroiled in a constitutional crisis.
In 1879 and 1880, Congress passed five separate army appropriations bills that contained riders prohibiting the use of appropriated funds
for the maintenance of federal troops as aposse comitatus.10 2 The bills
.provided for criminal penalties in the event that the funding limitations
were disregarded.10 3 President Hayes, understanding the full import of
what Congress was attempting to do, vetoed every one. In a veto
message that has been said to "resemble[ ] a lengthy Supreme Court
opinion on the separation of powers,"" ° President Hayes stated that
"[tlhe enactment of this bill into a law will establish a precedent which
will tend to destroy the equal independence of the several branches of the
Government. Its principle places not merely the Senate and the Executive, but the Judiciary also, under the coercive dictation of the House."10' 5
F. The Bill of Attainder Clause
The Constitution provides that "[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post
facto Law shall be passed."' 0 6 In the Bill of Attainder Case,10 7 the
Supreme Court ruled that a rider on an appropriations bill could function as a bill of attainder. The case involved section 304 of the Urgent
Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943.108 That section provided that
[n]o part of any appropriation, allocation, or fund (1) which is
made available under or pursuant to this Act, or (2) which is now,
or which is hereafter made, available under or pursuant to any
other Act, to any department, agency, or instrumentality of the
United States, shall be used, after November 15, 1943, to pay any
part of the salary, or other compensation for the personal services,
of Goodwin B. Watson, William E. Dodd, Junior, and Robert
Morss Lovett, unless prior to such date such person has been ap101. Sidak, supra note 4, at 1217-22.
102. H.R. 1, 46th Cong., 1st Sess. (1879); H.R. 2, 46th Cong., 1st Sess. (1879); H.R. 2252,
46th Cong., 1st Sess. (1879); H.R. 2382, 46th Cong., 1st Sess. (1879); H.R. 4924, 46th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1880). See also Sidak, supra note 4, at 1218.
103. Sidak, supra note 4, at 1218.
104. Id at 1220.
105. Veto Message of Rutherford B. Hayes (Apr. 29, 1879), in 9 MESSAGES AND PAPERS
OF THE PRESIDENTS 4475, 4483 (James Richardson ed., 1897).

106. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
3.
107. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
108. Pub. L. No. 78-132, 57 Stat. 431 (1943).
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pointed by the President, by and with the consent of the Senate
The amendment was prompted by a congressional effort,
spearheaded by Congressman Martin Dies, to curtail the influence of
"subversives" occupying positions in the federal government."°9 The
three government employees named in the act were considered, in the
words of Congressman Dies, "irresponsible, unrepresentative, crackpot,
radical bureaucrats" and affiliates of "Communist front organizations."1 10 The purpose of section 304, then, was to rid the federal government of subversives and to "protect the Nation against sabotage and
fifth-column activity." ' ' The Supreme Court ruled that the section fell
"precisely within the category of congressional actions which the Constitution barred"' 12 as bills of attainder.
I.

Prosecutorial Discretion and the Take Care Clause

The Vesting Clause of Article II provides that "[t]he executive
13
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."'
The Constitution further provides that the President "shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed...." 1 1 4 The extent of the executive
power, and the nature of the laws the President is bound to execute, have
been a matter of some debate. The debate concerns the extent to which
Congress can, through appropriations riders, direct the implementation
of laws it has already passed without amending the underlying statutes.
There are two lines of reasoning on this issue. One contends that
since the Constitution does not distinguish between authorization and
appropriations bills, the latter are as much a part of the law to be executed as are the former. Neal Devins writes that "[l]imitation riders are
as much an act of Congress as are authorizations,"' 15 and that "there is
no doubt that appropriations bills can establish, amend, or repeal federal
programs and priorities.""' 6 And . Gregory Sidak observes that "[i]t is
generally accepted - rather unquestioningly in light of the history of the
appropriations clause - that Congress may enact or repeal substantive
legislation by means of a rider to an appropriations bill.""' 7 Under this
109. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 308.
110. Id.at 308-09.

111. Id at 310.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id at 315.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1,cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
Devins, supra note 4, at 472.
Id. at 481.
Sidak, supra note 4, at 1206.
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view, it makes no difference whether Congress chooses to enact substantive legislation through the authorizations process or through the appropriations process.
The second line of reasoning suggests that limiting executive discretion through the use of appropriations bills effectively prohibits the Executive from fulfilling its constitutional duty to execute the underlying
substantive law. Archie Parnell has written that "[i]f the power to execute the laws means anything, it is that neither Congress nor individual
congressmen may interfere with the executive decisions of administrative
agencies as to how they interpret the laws already in force."' 1 8 Under
this view, Congress is free to amend the underlying statutes, but may not
attempt to direct execution of laws already in force.
The Supreme Court has expressed support for both lines of reasoning. In United States v. Dickerson, 1 9 the Court held that a limitation
rider on an appropriations bill had the effect of permanently amending
the underlying substantive legislation. According to the Court, there was
"no doubt" that Congress could utilize the appropriations process to
amend the underlying statute. 2 0 On the other hand, in Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill,'2 ' the Court recognized that, while "both substantive
enactments and appropriations measures are 'Acts of Congress,'... the
latter have the limited and specific purpose of providing funds for authorized programs.... [Otherwise,] every appropriations measure would be
pregnant with prospects of altering substantive legislation ....122
This second line of reasoning is more compelling than the first. It
would subvert the entire notion of separation of powers to allow Congress to direct the implementation of laws already enacted. The concept
of the rule of law requires those who enact legislation to refrain from
executing it. Only then is the risk of a tyrannical legislature averted. If
Congress is permitted to control the implementation of laws, it will be
free to tailor those laws to suit its whims.
The first line of reasoning, in addition to raising separation-of-powers objections, also raises a number of prudential concerns. The first is
that appropriations riders often place executive agencies in the difficult, if
not untenable, position of having to decide when a rider is essentially an
amendment of the underlying statute. Parnell has pointed out that limitation riders will force an agency to ask the following questions: "Do
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Parnell, supra note 61, at 1379.
310 U.S. 554 (1940).
Id at 555.
437 U.S. 153 (1978).
Id at 190.
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changes in the law apply only for the last quarter of one calendar tax
year and for the next three quarters of the next calendar tax year? At the
end of the fiscal year, does the former substantive law again come into
effect?" 12' 3 Inconsistent answers to questions such as these could seriously disrupt the execution of the laws. Legislating through appropriations riders also makes it difficult for citizens to know what the law is. A
person looking at a statute has no way of knowing whether it has been
modified or repealed through the use of an appropriations bill.
Additionally, substantive policy changes contained in appropriations riders are objectionable because they often do not receive adequate
consideration. Riders are usually introduced during floor debate on the
bill in question, and voted on at a time when few if any congressional
members have given them the attention appropriate to questions of policy. For this reason, one Senator described limitation riders as "an insult
to the legislative process ....
[They] are often offered with no advance
warning and with little explanation. They are taken up in circumstances
where they cannot be carefully considered and are unlikely to be fully
understood."' 2 4 Another member of Congress described the process as
follows: "Frequently, copies of the amendment or 'rider' are not available when Congress is scheduled to vote, nor are Congressional staff
aides provided with adequate time to review appropriation amendments
and prepare background material for meaningful debate or reflective
5
' 12

voting."

Finally, the fact that Congress often relies on limitation riders to
enact substantive policy changes, even though amending the authorization statutes would be a more direct method, suggests that there is some
impediment - either constitutional or political - preventing Congress
from enacting the desired legislation through the use of "normal" channels. In these cases, Congress may be attempting to enact legislation
that, if put in the form of substantive legislation, would be unconstitutional. For instance, Congress may be attempting to influence the outcome of a specific adjudication, or it may be trying to direct
implementation of a law with respect to a limited class of persons, when
substantive legislation designed to achieve the same results would violate
the Due Process Clause or the Bill of Attainder Clause in the one instance, or the Equal Protection Clause in the other.
123. Parnell, supra note 61, at 1376.
124. Murray, House Funding Bill Riders Become Potent Policy Force, 38 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 3251, 3252 (Nov. 1, 1980) (quoting Senator Harrison Williams, Jr.).
125. Charles B. Rangel, Use of CongressionalRules to Delay Progressin Civil Rights Policy,
8 J. LEGIS. 62, 65 (1981). Mr. Rangel is a member of the U.S. House of Representatives (DN.Y.).
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Alternatively, Congress may face legitimate political obstacles to enactment of the same legislation through substantive channels. Particular
members of Congress may use appropriations riders to enact substantive
policy changes that would not survive the heightened scrutiny of the authorization process. Or, they may use the riders to enact legislation that
would never be signed into law by a President whose administration was
not in dire need of funds. This state of affairs cannot be considered a
virtue of the system.
In sum, both separation-of-powers concerns and prudential concerns indicate that Congress should not be allowed to affect the execution
of laws through the use of limitation riders on appropriations bills. The
primary consideration remains this: In prohibiting the executive branch
from using funds to implement the laws, Congress prevents the President
from fulfilling his or her constitutionally mandated duty to take care that
the laws are faithfully executed. This Congress may not do.
One can argue that there is no difference between Congress's failure
to fund execution of the laws pursuant to a particular interpretation of
those laws, and Congress's failure to fund the execution of the laws in
general. In other words, Congress's use of the limitation rider no more
prevents the President from executing the laws than does Congress's failure to appropriate adequate funding (and failing to appropriate funds for
statutorily mandated programs is of course well within Congress's constitutional powers 126). Accordingly, the distinction between limitation riders and inadequate levels of funding is one of quantity, not quality.
This theory is true only as far as it goes. In addition to the quantitative difference between the two modes of withholding funding, there is a
qualitative difference arising from the specificity of the limitation rider.
Inadequate funding may hamper the Executive in its duty to execute the
law, but it does not subvert the rule of law in the way that limitation
riders do. Limitation riders that attempt to direct the President's enforcement of the law are inconsistent with the notion of separation of
powers because they impose Congress's will unilaterally.
This line of reasoning is consistent with the most recent Supreme
Court pronouncement on the issue in Bowsher v. Synar:
Congress of course initially determine[s] the content of the [law];
and undoubtedly the content of the [law] determines the nature of
the executive duty. However, . . once Congress makes its choice
126. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. The practice of appropriating insufficient
funds to hinder statutory law (as opposed to constitutional law) can be seen as legitimate if one
interprets the lack of funds as a repeal of the underlying statute. Since Congress cannot repeal
the Constitution, it cannot accomplish the same end by failing to appropriate funds necessary
to enforce the Constitution.
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in enacting legislation, its participation ends. Congress can thereafter control the2execution
of its laws only indirectly - by passing
7
new legislation.'
Despite the evident clarity of these words, Congress from time to
time attempts to command the Executive to adopt one or another interpretation of a substantive statute. The Supplemental Appropriations Act
of 1987128 contained an example of this type of legislative encroachment
into the executive realm. Section 505 of that Act provides:
None of the funds appropriated or made available by this or any
other Act or otherwise appropriated or made available to the Secretary of Transportation or the Maritime Administrator for purposes of administering the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as
amended (46 U.S.C. [§] 1101 et seq.), shall be used by the United
States Department of Transportation or the United States Maritime Administration to propose, promulgate, or implement any
rule or regulation, or, with regard to vessels which repaid subsidy
pursuant to the rule promulgated by the Secretary May 3, 1985,
and vacated by Order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit January 16, 1987, conduct any adjudicatory or regulatory
proceeding, execute or perform any contract, or participate in any
judicial action with respect to the repayment of construction differential subsidy for the permanent release of vessels from the restrictions in section 506 of the Merchant Marine Act .... 2 9
President Reagan correctly believed that this measure did not represent a
valid exercise of legislative power. In his signing statement, the President
stated:
Article II of the Constitution assigns responsibility for executing
the law to the President. While the Congress is empowered to enact new or different laws, it may not indirectly interpret and implement existing laws, which is an essential function allocated by the
Constitution to the executive branch. If the Congress disagrees
with a statutory interpretation advanced by the executive branch
- or with the efforts of the executive branch to defend or prosecute judicial action based on that interpretation - the Congress
may, of course, amend the underlying statute. The use of an appropriations bill for this purpose, however, is inconsistent with the
127. 478 U.S. 714, 733-34 (1986) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1983)). The
Court in .Bowsher found a provision of the Gramm-Rudman deficit reduction act unconstitutional. The act appointed the Comptroller General, allowed the Comptroller General to select
which programs to cut (an executive function), and gave Congress the power to remove unilaterally the Comptroller General. The Court held "that Congress cannot reserve for itself the
power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment."
Id. at 726.
128. Pub. L. No. 100-71, 101 Stat. 391 (1987).
129. Id. § 505, 101 Stat. at 471.
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constitutional scheme of separation of powers. 13 °
Another example of Congress's dictating the proper interpretation
of a statute involved the so-called Baxter Amendment to the antitrust
laws. In 1911, the Supreme Court ruled in Dr.Miles Medical Co. v. John
D. Park & Sons Co. 131 that vertical price fixing, or resale price maintenance, constituted a per se violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Since
then, economists have pointed out that such agreements can often promote economic efficiency by encouraging non-price forms of competition
1 32
that the market cannot provide because of the free-rider problem.
Thus, when William F. Baxter took over the post of Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division in
1981, his division consistently refused to bring antitrust actions against
manufacturers who utilized resale price maintenance agreements, and
often filed amicus briefs in private antitrust actions urging that Dr.Miles
be overturned.
One such private action was Monsanto Co. v. Spray Rite Service
Corp.133 Spray Rite, a wholesale distributor of Monsanto Herbicides,
sued Monsanto for damages caused by Monsanto's enforcement of a resale price maintenance agreement. At the close of trial, the jury awarded
$3.5 million to Spray Rite, which the district court trebled to $10.5 million. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on Dr.Miles, upheld
the verdict. 134 When Monsanto appealed to the Supreme Court, the Justice Department fied an amicus brief urging that Dr. Miles be overturned, arguing that "[a] per se rule against resale price maintenance can
be justified only if there is some persuasive basis for supposing that the
practice reduces output, retards innovation, or otherwise interferes with
130. Statement on Signing H.R. 1827 into Law, 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 800 (July
11, 1987).
131. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
132. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 128-29 (1972).
The theory may be summed up as follows: Certain products are best sold in conjunction with
certain services. These services may add significantly to the retailer's cost. For example, hi-fi
equipment is best sold in conjunction with an opportunity for the prospective purchaser to
examine and experiment with the equipment. This requires the retailer to build, at significant
cost, extra rooms for display and audition. In a free market, retailers will have an incentive to
free ride, each attempting to take advantage of the others' provision of the supplemental services. In our example, stereo shoppers will go first to an expensive retail outlet to audition the
equipment, then to a stripped-down discount house to buy it. Eventually, the system will
collapse, no retailer will offer the extra services, and fewer people will purchase the product.
Retail price maintenance, the theory goes, is a method of preventing retailers from undercutting one another, and at the same time allowing them sufficient profits to enable them to provide the supplemental services.
133. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
134. The Seventh Circuit obtained a remittitur of $172,412 for excessive damages. Spray
Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1251 (7th Cir. 1982).
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Sherman Act goals." 1' 35 Baxter further argued that "the Court has never
analyzed resale price maintenance in terms of its actual economic effects,
much less found that those effects are so necessarily anti-competitive as
to justify a per se ban."' 3 6 But five months after the Justice Department
filed its amicus brief, and just one week before the case came up for oral
argument, Congress passed the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and
State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of
'
1984. 37
Section 510 of that Act provided that "[n]one of the funds appropriated in title I and title II of this Act may be used for any activity,
the purpose of which is to overturn or alter the per se prohibition on
resale price maintenance in effect under Federal antitrust laws."' 3 8 President Reagan signed the bill into law, but expressed "strong reservations
about the constitutional implications of section 510 . . ,,119 One week
later, at oral argument, Baxter dutifully withdrew the argument, contained in section II(B) of his brief, that Dr. Miles should be overturned. " Instead, Baxter argued that although Dr. Miles should not
actually be overturned, it should not be applied to the facts of the case at
hand.'
In doing so, Baxter may have acceded to an unconstitutional
congressional demand.
In both the Merchant Marine and the antitrust areas, Congress attempted to influence the executive's interpretation of a law through the
use of an appropriations rider, thereby impermissibly intruding on executive discretion. In both areas, the change in policy that Congress sought
to advance could have been enacted through substantive legislation.
Congress chose instead to utilize appropriations riders. The implications
135. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Monsanto Co. v. Spray Rite Serv. Corp.,
465 U.S. 752 (1984) (No. 82-914), reprinted in David Lauter, Antitrust Revolution Slows,
NAT'L L.J., July 25, 1983, at 1.
136. Id.
137. Pub. L. No. 98-166, 97 Stat. 1071 (1983).
138. Id., 97 Stat. at 1102.
139. Statement on Signing a Fiscal Year 1984 Appropriations Bill, 1983 PUB. PAPERS 1627
(Nov. 28, 1983). The President stated:
I do not understand Congress to have intended by this provision to limit or direct
prosecutorial discretion, or otherwise to restrict the government's ability to enforce
the antitrust laws within the framework of existing case law. Thus, despite the
breadth of its language, pursuant to the advice of the Attorney General, I interpret
section 510 narrowly to apply only to attempts to seek a reversal of the holdings of a
certain line of previously decided cases. Even as narrowly construed, however, the
provision potentially imposes an unconstitutional burden on executive officials
charged with enforcing the antitrust laws. Therefore, I believe it is my constitutional
responsibility to apply section 510 in any particular situation consistently with the
President's power and duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
140. Baxter Urges Supreme Court to Adopt New Rule on Resale Price Maintenance,DAILY
REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, Dec. 5, 1983, at A-14.
141. Id.
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of such a course of action are clear from the antitrust case, where, it
could be argued, Congress came close to enacting a bill of attainder. At
the core of the notion of separation of powers lies the concern that Congress ought not to be able to influence the outcome of any piece of adjudication. If Congress perceives that it may do with impunity what it
attempted to do with the Baxter Amendment, it may well become emboldened. This result should be avoided.
IV.
A.

Foreign Relations

Introduction

The complicated constitutional relationship between the executive
and the legislative branches in the realm of foreign affairs has caused
considerable difficulty for theorists. As with matters of prosecutorial discretion, foreign policy issues present difficult questions concerning the
proper level of legislative oversight of executive activity. Professor Stith
writes that "[i]n the areas of foreign affairs and federal prosecution, it is
generally conceded that Congress cannot closely circumscribe agency
powers and the strategies of government policy, much less the particulars
of government action." 14 2 On the other hand, Mr. Fisher points out that
"[ilt is false to assume that conditions on appropriations bills are proper
for domestic legislation but impermissible for legislation governing foreign power and the war power." 143 Similarly, Professor Tribe has written that Congress "may condition appropriations in ways that limit
144
presidential foreign policy choices."
The confusion stems in part from the intricate structure contemplated by the Constitution. The Treaty and Appointments Clauses provide that the President "shall have [the] Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the
1 45
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors .... ,
The Constitution also provides that the President "shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers .... ."14 It-further provides that "[t]he
President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into
142. Stith, supra note 3, at 1383.
143. Fisher, supra note 4, at 762.
144. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-4, at 222 (2d ed.

1988).
145. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
146. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 19:457

the actual Service of the United States .... 147
The Constitution grants to Congress the power "[t]o declare War,
grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures-on Land and Water"; 14 1 "[t]o raise and support Armies"; 4 9 "tlo
provide and maintain a Navy";15 0 "[t]o make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces"; 5 ' "[t]o provide for calling
forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions"; 5 2 and "[t]o provide for organizing, arming,
and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may
be employed in the Service of the United States ....
Congress's use of appropriation riders to maneuver within this intricate structure of foreign relations is subject to the same constitutional
constraints as is legislation designed to direct the implementation of domestic policies. First, Congress may not enact appropriations riders that
are contrary to specific constitutional proscriptions. For example, Congress could not enact an appropriations rider prohibiting the use of funds
for the reception of foreign ambassadors. Second, Congress may not interfere impermissibly with the exercise of executive discretion in the
realm of foreign relations. The problem, of course, is defining "impermissible" in this context.
Analyses of domestic legislation and of foreign affairs legislation in
this context may be superficially similar, but a fundamental difference
distinguishes them. The analysis of the preceding separation-of-powers
issues first considers whether Congress has violated a specific constitutional proscription - such as the Bill of Attainder Clause - and then
considers whether Congress has intruded impermissibly on executive discretion. The former inquiry implicates specific constitutional proscriptions, whereas the latter involves a more general analysis under the Take
Care Clause. These two inquiries are more easily separable with respect
to domestic legislation than to foreign affairs legislation. Thus, the question of whether Congress has passed a bill of attainder is distinct from
that of whether Congress has passed a bill which infringes on executive
discretion. In foreign affairs, however, 'the question of whether Congress
intruded impermissibly into executive discretion is really the same question as whether Congress violated the specific constitutional proscription
147. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl.1.
148. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
149. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.

150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl.13.
151.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.

152. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, Ci. 15.
153. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl. 16.

Winter 19921

APPROPRIATIONS RIDERS

at issue. For instance, one cannot answer the question of whether Congress has violated the Commander-in-Chief Clause without first determining the appropriate quantum of discretion which that position
entails.
Accordingly, Part B will first present a framework for determining
the level of discretion inherent in the President's role as the sole actor of
the United States in its conduct of foreign affairs. This framework will
then be applied in Parts C and D to some of the specific clauses in the
Constitution that incorporate the idea of executive discretion in the
realm of foreign relations, including the Appointments, Treaty, and
Commander-in-Chief Clauses.
B.

Executive Discretion in Foreign Affairs

One way to define the proper respective roles of Congress and the
President in the realm of foreign affairs is to demarcate those areas where
one branch is better suited to operate. Congress, as a large deliberative
body, is well suited to prescribing the ultimate objectives of foreign relations, and to establishing general policies calculated to promote those
objectives. The President, on the other hand, is unitary and, to borrow a
term from Hamilton, more "energetic,""1 4 and is therefore better suited
to act in situations where dispatch is needed.
The President is better suited than Congress to oversee many aspects
of foreign policy for a number of reasons related to his greater "energy."
The unitary nature of the Executive not only lends itself to dispatch, but
also presents a stronger, more solid, and more trustworthy face to other
nations. The importance of a strong appearance cannot be underestimated in the course of foreign relations. A President compelled to obtain
the approval of Congress for significant moves during negotiations would
lose this advantage. As a result, those negotiating with the United States
would lose confidence in the ability of the ambassador to enter into any
binding agreement on even the most insignificant details. The Supreme

Court has recognized this concern in cases such as United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,155 in which Justice Sutherland wrote:
It is quite apparent that if,
in the maintenance of our international
relations, embarrassment - perhaps serious embarrassment - is
to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the
President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory re154. See, ag., THE FEDERALST No. 70, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Carl Van Doren
ed., 1973).
155. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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striction which
would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone
156
involved.
Similarly, the trustworthiness of an ambassador plays a key role in
negotiations. Representatives of foreign governments would be loathe to
disclose strategic details to an ambassador directly accountable to Congress. As John Jay wrote, "There doubtless are many... who would
rely on the secrecy of the President, but who would not confide in that of
the Senate, and still less in that of a large popular assembly." 1 7 George
Washington delivered a powerful statement of this reasoning when he
refused to comply with a congressional request to produce certain documents relating to the negotiation of the Jay Treaty with Great Britain:
The nature of foreign relations requires caution, and their success
must often depend on secrecy; and even when brought to a conclusion a full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions which may have been proposed or contemplated would be
extremely impolitic; for this might have a pernicious influence on
future negotiations, or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps
danger and mischief, in relation to other powers. The necessity of
such caution and secrecy was one cogent reason for vesting the
power of making treaties in the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the principle on which that body was formed
confining it to a small number of members.' 5 8
The President's close involvement with the diplomatic corps suggests other ways in which the President is better suited to oversee foreign
affairs. The President's access to information concerning foreign relations is more regular and more in-depth than that available to Congress.
As the Court noted in Curtiss-Wright,the President, "not Congress, has
the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign
countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic,
consular, and other officials."' 5 9 In addition to his access to information
regarding the current state of international relations, the President is
privy to information concerning negotiations already concluded, and the
strategies and tactics that have proved effective in the past. Due to the
complex nature of negotiations, tactics that might appear foolhardy to
someone inexperienced in the field might well produce the best results.
In 1816, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations voiced this
sentiment:
156. Id. at 320.
157. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 392 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
158. 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 194 (James Richardson ed., 1897).
159. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
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The President is the constitutional representative of the United
States with regard to foreign nations. He manages our concerns
with foreign nations and must necessarily be most competent to
determine when, how, and upon what subjects negotiation may be
urged with the greatest prospect of success. For his conduct he is
responsible to the Constitution. 6 °
These considerations suggest a method of determining what congressional directives "impermissibly" intrude into the realm of executive
discretion in foreign affairs: Congress should not be allowed to do anything the President is better suited to do. For instance, Congress cannot
direct the movement of troops during wartime because the President
alone can act with the necessary dispatch. Congress could not appoint
its own members to conduct negotiations with foreign nations because its
members may not be schooled in the art of diplomacy and because Congress as a body cannot be trusted to keep secrets. The following section
applies this concededly simple test to various instances of congressional
involvement in foreign affairs which Congress achieved through the use
of limitation riders.
C. The Treaty and Appointments Clauses
The Treaty and Appointments Clauses provide that the President
"shall have [the] Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur;
and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors ....-"I6 The Constitution also provides that the President "shall receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers."' 6 2 Taken together, these two Clauses dictate an expansive
role for the executive branch in the conduct of diplomacy. Despite this
language, in recent years Congress has not been satisfied with the limited
role which the Constitution assigns to it in the conduct of negotiation.
In 1989, Representative Bill Richardson of New Mexico complained
before Congress that the executive branch had excluded Congress from
involvement in the Helsinki Commission. Richardson stated that "the
Department of State has precluded the participation of Congress in the
important substance of the conference."' 6 3 In order to remedy what he
viewed as an unacceptable situation, Congressman Richardson proposed
an amendment to the bill appropriating funds for the operation of the
160. COMPILATION OF REPORTS OF THE COMMITrEE ON
No. 231, Part 8, 56th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1901).
161. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
162. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
163. 135 CONG. REC. E2756 (daily ed. July 31, 1989).

FOREIGN RELATIONS,

S.Doc.
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Department of State.l' 4 If adopted, the amendment would have prohibited "the obligation or expenditure of funds for any meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the
Helsinki Commission."' 65 This type of attempt by Congress to participate in foreign negotiations, or to prohibit such negotiations entirely, is
remarkable in light of the plain meaning of the Constitution.
Surprisingly, a majority of Congress appears to share Representative
Richardson's concerns, for while Congress did not approve Richardson's
rider, it adopted a slightly different one later. In its final form, the rider
adopted by Congress does not deny funds completely, as Representative
Richardson had proposed, but simply places a condition on the expenditure of those funds. Paragraph (1) of section 102 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1990166 authorizes funding for United States
delegations to International Conferences and Contingencies, but paragraph (2) provides that
[n]one of the funds authorized to be appropriated under paragraph
(1) may be obligated or expended for any United States delegation
to any meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE) or meetings within the framework of the CSCE
unless the United States delegation to any such meeting includes
individuals representing
the Commission on Security and Coopera67
tion in Europe.'
The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe is an organ of
the legislative branch. Thus, Congress, through the use of the rider, attempted to enter into the realm of negotiations. Because this is an area
for which the Executive is better suited, this provision intrudes impermissibly on executive control of foreign relations. More specifically, it
intrudes on the President's ability both to appoint ambassadors and to
enter into treaties.
Section 108 of the same Act amends the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (22 U.S.C. 2151) to include the
following limitation:
[N]o funds authorized to be appropriated by this or any other Act
may be obligated or made available for the conduct of the current
dialogue on the Middle East peace process with any representative
of the Palestine Liberation Organization if the President knows
and advises the Congress that that representative directly participated in planning or execution of a particular terrorist activity
164. Id.; Foreign Relations Authorization Act, fiscal years 1990 and 1991, Pub. L. No.
101-246, 104 Stat. 15 (1990).
165. 135 CONG. REc. E2756 (daily ed. July 31, 1989).
166. Pub. L. No. 101-246, 104 Stat. 15, 19 (1990).
167. Id
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which resulted in the death or kidnapping of a United States
citizen.
This provision represents an impermissible attempt by Congress to interfere with executive discretion. The 1816 Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations observed that the President was best suited to determining
when, how, and on what subjects negotiations should be attempted. The
words "with whom" could easily be added to this list. The President is
intimately familiar with the international political ramifications of negotiating with representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization or
other internationally controversial organizations. The President alone is
qualified to decide whether the formal recognition of a nation will have
adverse consequences. The limitation rider was an impermissible intrusion into an area best left to the Executive. This is a conclusion with
which President Bush agrees. 6 '
Some of Congress's attempts at involvement in foreign policy may
be acceptable. Section 104 of the Intelligence Authorization Act, fiscal
year 1989,169 prohibits the use of funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity
of the United States to provide assistance to the Nicaraguan Democratic
Resistance (the Contras), except as specifically provided by law. In his
signing statement, President Reagan expressed his belief that the provision could impinge on his power to conduct foreign affairs. 170 Under the
theory advocated here, it is not clear that the President's contention has a
firm basis in the Constitution. The Constitution grants to Congress the
power to declare war, so presumably Congress is at least as well suited as
the President to determine when armed hostilities are appropriate.
Moreover, if Congress is well suited to make that determination, it is
probably also well suited to determine whether the United States should
assist the armed resistance to the Nicaraguan government. Congress,
17 1
then, was arguably within its rights in passing this limitation rider.
168. See Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990
and 1991, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 266 (Feb. 16, 1990).
169. Pub. L. No. 100-453, 102 Stat. 1904, 1905 (1988).
170. Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, at 1988
PUB. PAPERS 1249-50 (Sept. 29, 1988). The President noted that an analogous restriction contained in previous annual intelligence authorization acts applied only to federal entities engaged in intelligence activities. He then stated that he had "signed the Act with the
understanding that the extension of the restriction to all entities of the United States Government is not intended to, and does not, apply in a manner and to an extent that would conflict
with my constitutional authority and duty to conduct the foreign relations of the United
States."
171. The history of the Boland Amendment has been covered in detail elsewhere. For a

good discussion, see Fisher, supra note 4.
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A similarly acceptable limitation is contained in the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of
1990.172 Section 582(a) of that Act provides:
None of the funds appropriated by this Act may be provided to any
foreign government (including any instrumentality or agency
thereof), foreign person, or United States person in exchange for
that foreign government or person undertaking any action which
is, if carried out by the United States Government, a United States
official or employee, expressly prohibited by a provision of United
States law.
President Bush objected to the provision on the grounds that it was too
all-encompassing and that it would consequently chill the conduct of diplomacy.17 Again, however, the provision on its face is the result of a
policy decision that Congress is at least as well suited as the President to
make. No special virtue of the unitary executive, or at least none considered here, makes it more able to choose when to circumvent United
States laws.
D. The Commander-in-Chief Clause
The Constitution provides that "tihe President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the
Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the
United States .... ,171 Congress and the President have disagreed about
precisely what this position entails. The Supreme Court has stated that
this Clause empowers the President "to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ
them in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer
and subdue the enemy."' 75 This statement and others like it, however,
have done little to define the contours of the power of Commander-inChief.
The two branches recently disagreed over what measures the President may take to ensure that information affecting national security is
not unintentionally leaked. President Reagan requested several executive
departments to devise methods to increase the Executives ability to pre172. Pub. L. No. 101-167, 103 Stat. 1195 (1989).
173. Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1990, 25 WEEKLY COMP. Pans. Doc. 1810 (Nov. 21, 1989) ("Diplomacy by its nature involves give-and-take. Many routine and unobjectionable diplomatic
activities could be misconstrued as somehow involving a forbidden 'exchange.' Given the ease
with which such activities would be so misconstrued, this type of provision can chill U.S.
diplomats in the proper discharge of their duties.").
174. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
175. Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615 (1850).
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vent such leaks. As a result, two standard forms were drafted in 1982 by
the Information Security Oversight Office, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Department of Defense.176 The forms, Standard Form
189 and Standard Form 4193, embody several methods for restricting
unauthorized disclosure of information affecting national security."'
The forms, which defense employees were required to execute, restricted
access to information not yet classified; provided for mandatory prepublication review of any manuscript containing, or purporting to contain, or
derived from classified information; and provided for civil remedies in
178
the event of unauthorized disclosure.
Congress, concerned that use of the forms might restrict its access to
security information, responded with an amendment to the Omnibus
Continuing Resolution of 1988.179 Section 630 of that Act provides:
No funds appropriated in this or any other Act for fiscal year 1988
may be used to implement or enforce the agreements in Standard
Forms 189 and 4193 of the Government or any other nondisclosure policy, form or agreement if such policy, form or agreement:
(1) concerns information other than that specifically marked as
classified; or, unmarked but known by the employee to be classified; or, unclassified but known by the employee to be in the process of a classification determination;
(2) contains the term "classifiable";
(3) directly or indirectly obstructs, by requirement of prior written
authorization, limitation of authorized disclosure, or otherwise, the
right of any individual to petition or communicate with Members
of Congress in a secure manner as provided by the rules and procedures of the Congress;
(4) interferes with the right of the Congress to obtain executive
branch information in a secure manner as provided by the rules
and procedures of the Congress;
(5) imposes any obligations or invokes any remedies inconsistent
with statutory law .... 8. o
In 1987, three individuals, two federal employee unions, and several
members of Congress sued to enjoin the use of the forms, claiming, inter
alia, that the use of the forms violated section 630 of the omnibus continuing resolution. 8 ' The defendants claimed that section 630 represented
an unconstitutional interference with executive control over national se176. See National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 671, 674-75
(D.D.C. Cir. 1988).
177. Id
178. Id.
179. Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329 (1987).
180. Id.
181. NationalFed'n ofFed. Employees, 688 F. Supp. at 674-75.
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curity. The District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that section
630 was inconsistent with the President's authority in the field of national security." 2 The court relied, in dismissing the case, on a 1988 case
in which the Supreme Court described the source and extent of executive
power over national security, Department of the Navy v. Egan.1 83 The
case involved a Navy employee who had been discharged when his security clearance was revoked. The Egan Court held that the decision to
grant, deny, or revoke a security clearance was an unreviewable one,
committed to executive discretion. 8 4 In support for this finding, Justice
Blackmun observed:
The President, after all, is the "Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States." U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2. His
authority to classify and control access to information bearing on
national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position in the Executive Branch
that will give that person access to such information flows primarily from this constitutional investment of power in the President
and exists quite apart from any explicit congressional grant.' 8 5
The plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which vacated and remanded the district court's ruling on the grounds that the
lower court improperly reached unnecessary constitutional questions."8 6
The Court noted that the government had replaced Standard Forms 189
and 4193 with Standard Forms 312 and 4355 shortly after the passage of
the omnibus continuing resolution. Neither of the new forms contained
the word "classifiable." This substitution necessitated a closer examination of whether the government was acting in accordance with the proscriptions of section 630, or whether the new forms violated the section's
prohibition, as had the older forms. The Supreme Court did not consider
it appropriate to reach the constitutional ruling, and reminded the district court that it "should not pronounce upon the relative constitutional
authority of Congress and the Executive Branch unless it finds it impera'
tive to do so. 187

By the time the case returned to the district court,18 Congress had
replaced section 630 with an analogous section in an analogous act: section 618 of the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Ap182. I. at 685.

183. 484 U.S. 518 (1988).
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

d at 527.
Idi
American Foreign Serv. Ass'n v. Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153 (1989).
Id. at 161.
American Foreign Serv. Ass'n v. Garfinkel, 732 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1990).
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propriations Act, Fiscal Year 1990,19 is identical in all respects, with the
exception that Congress replaced mention of Standard Forms 189 and
4193 with mention of Standard Forms 312 and 4355. In accordance with
the Supreme Court's instructions, the district court set out to determine
whether the government's continued use of Forms 312 and 4355 violated
the new Act. The plaintiffs argued that section 618 operated as a complete bar to the use of the forms, and the defendants argued that the
section prohibited the use of the specifically enumerated forms only if
such use also violated the more general proscriptions set forth in subsections (1) through (5) of the section. The court adopted the latter construction. 19° Because the plaintiffs failed to make the alternative
argument that continued use of the forms did in fact violate the proscriptions of subsections (1) through (5), the court concluded that continued
use of the forms did not violate the section.19 '
The limitation rider at issue poses a problem for the theory advocated by this Article. On the one hand, the President may be better
suited than Congress to determine the appropriate manner for preventing
unintentional leaking of information affecting national security. Expertise in keeping secrets, expertise enhanced by executive agencies such as
the Information Security Oversight Office, the Central Intelligence
Agency, and the Department of Defense, puts the President in a better
position to regulate access to vital information.
On the other hand, the plain text of the Constitution grants to Congress the power "[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of
the land and naval Forces."' 92 In such a case, any reconstructivist theory of the separation of powers must yield to the text of the document.
The limitation rider in question, therefore, appears to be a valid exercise
of Congress's power to regulate the armed forces.
V.

Remedies

Assuming that Congress and the President will often arrive at different conclusions regarding the constitutionality of particular limitation
riders, the question becomes one of which interpretation will prevail.
Although these differing interpretations might easily create constitutional impasses, such crises could be resolved in a number of ways.
When Congress attaches to appropriations bills limitations riders
that the President believes to be unconstitutional, the President could
189.
190.
191.
192.

Pub. L. No. 101-136, 103 Stat. 783, 820 (1989).
Garfinkel, 732 F. Supp. at 16.
Id.
U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, c. 14.
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veto the legislation and inform Congress that he will veto any piece of
legislation containing the offending provision. President Hayes chose
this approach during the Reconstruction. 193 The first problem with this
course is that it is not foolproof - a two-thirds vote of both houses could
override the veto. More importantly, this approach, together with a
President and a Congress both assured of the moral superiority of their
positions, could lead to a complete breakdown of whatever governmental
functions were to be funded by the bill containing the offending clause.
The President could simply abide by the condition, expressing regrets that he or she is constrained to do so, and ask that Congress in the
future avoid such unconstitutional limitations on the Executive. This approach, however, is largely ineffectual. The President could supplement
it through the political process. For example, the President could campaign on behalf of congressional candidates who oppose those Representatives and Senators who voted for the allegedly unconstitutional
limitation rider. This method, too, would likely prove ineffectual, due to
its reliance on widespread public appreciation of an obscure point of constitutional law.
The President could rely on a suit against the government by a private individual. Such an individual, however, might be difficult to find.
Of course, if Congress has denied the funds necessary for enforcement of
a particular constitutional right, there will be an aggrieved individual
somewhere. But in many instances no such individual will exist. For
example, a failure to spend money to assist in the Middle East peace
process, or to consider the discontinuation of farm subsidies, will not
aggrieve any particular citizen.
Finally, the President could simply ignore any spending limitations
that he or she believes unconstitutional. This appears to be the method
favored by President Bush.194 It is an effective method, and might be the
method that produces the least harm. In these cases, the President effectively returns the political ball to Congress's court. Congress may then
choose from a number of methods of ensuring executive compliance with
the funding limitations.
The first method Congress can use to enforce funding limitations is
provided by the Anti-Deficiency Act,19 5 which provides:
An officer or employee of the United States Government... may
not ... make or authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding
193. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
194. See L. Gordon Crovitz, President Bush Exercises the So-Sue-Me Line-Item Veto,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 1990, at A13.

195. 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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an amount available in an appropriation or fund for the expenditure or obligation; or... involve... [the] government in a contract
or obligation for the payment of19money
before an appropriation is
6
made unless authorized by law.
Congress's first option under this act is to prosecute the appropriate
members of the executive branch. Such prosecutions, however, are subject to the President's power to pardon. 1 97 Assuming that the President
will have ordered any action taken in violation of the Anti-Deficiency
Act, any sanctions imposed by the Act will be ineffectual.
A more functional variation of this method involves the use of a
special prosecutor. Congress could instruct the Attorney General to appoint a special prosecutor to investigate allegations of executive branch
violations of appropriations riders. While this method has been stigmatized by its prior use in only drastic circumstances, 19 it could be used
effectively by a Congress willing to make a firm stance on less momentous issues. If Congress is willing to take an even stronger position it
could, theoretically, resort to the impeachment process.199
In addition to openly adversarial methods, Congress could resort to
the more subtle political processes contemplated by the Constitution.
For example, Congress could diminish appropriations for the relevant
agency or department for the next fiscal year. Congress could engage in
the largely token and ineffectual practice of decreasing the funds available to the offending agency or department by an amount equal to that
expended in the current fiscal year on the unauthorized activity, an approach similar to that discussed in connection with funding for the National Endowment for the Arts. As a more drastic measure, Congress
could curtail the Executive's funds so severely that the Executive would
be forced to abandon the offending activity. This approach lacks the necessary specificity, however, and could provide no guarantee that the Ex196. Id
197. U.S. CONsr. art. 2, § 2, cl. 1.

198. See, eg., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 666 (1987) (controversy arising out of
allegations of mismanagement of the Environmental Protection Agency).
199. Of course, it is unlikely that Congress could garner the popular support necessary for
successful impeachment of a President charged with violating any but the most fundamental
funding limitation. The process of impeachment depends on the support of the electorate, and
such support would not be forthcoming when the President has violated, say, a limitations
rider dealing with the repayment of Merchant Marine subsidies. A second potential problem
with this approach is that grounds for impeachment are limited to "Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. This second problem, however,
may be met with the observance that unauthorized expenditures constitute violations of the
Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982), and are punishable by fines of up to $5,000 and
imprisonment of up to two years. As Mr. Sidak notes, "[C]ertainly, the President's intentional
violation of the Act could constitute a 'high Crime' subjecting the President to the risk of
impeachment." Sidak, supra note 4, at 1241.
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ecutive would not continue to engage in the offending activities. In
addition, the use of this method will result in the curtailment of many
desirable activities.
Congress could also rely on the election process to remove an errant
President from office. The opposing party could campaign on a platform
calling for respect for congressional directives. The obvious problem
with this approach is that, like resort to the impeachment process, it
depends on public understanding of, and support for, a Congress whose
views on an obscure and technical subject have been disobeyed. Presidential elections, however, rarely hinge on singular issues, especially issues that many voters would regard as insignificant.
In addition to these direct methods, Congress could rely on the less
direct, but more effective, use of private actions. Unlawful executive
spending might injure private parties who can satisfy current standing
requirements. Although the courts have universally rejected taxpayer
suits, unauthorized expenditure of funds by the Executive might give rise
to much more specific injuries. For example, a member of the armed
forces serving in an undeclared war might have standing to challenge the
expenditure of funds in that context. 2" This method, however, will not
always be available to Congress.
If Congress chooses to prosecute under the Anti-Deficiency Act, if it
requests a special prosecutor, or if it relies on private suits to achieve
executive compliance with limitation riders, a definitive ruling on the
permissibility of the funding limitation at issue will emerge from the controversy. In all three cases, a court will decide the question. In an area
where the provisions of the Constitution are so ill-defined and so difficult
to enforce, such a result would improve the orderly operation of the
government.
Finally, Congress could refrain from enacting substantive legislation
through the use of appropriations riders. This simple option seems to
have escaped Congress's attention, but it would be the most effective solution. In every case where Congress has attempted to control the executive branch through the use of such riders, it could have accomplished
the same end by directly enacting substantive legislation. In cases where
this results in an unconstitutional exercise of legislative authority, the
courts will strike down the legislation. But when Congress desires to
engage in a legitimate exercise of legislative authority, there is no reason
200. See, ag., Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971) (members of armed services
have standing to challenge Vietnam War, but Congress authorized or ratified executive
actions).
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why it should not utilize the more straightforward method of enacting
substantive legislation.
Such an approach would have some drawbacks. There will surely
be pieces of legislation that would pass through Congress largely unconsidered in the form of appropriations riders, but that would not survive
the heightened scrutiny of the authorization process. Similarly, there
will doubtless be pieces of legislation that, in the form of appropriations
riders, would be signed into law by a President whose administration was
in dire need of funding, but that would otherwise be vetoed. Neither of
these results should be considered undesirable. Legislation that cannot
survive on its own merit should not be forced on an unknowing Congress
or an unwilling President.
Conclusion
Congress's power to appropriate - or withhold - money for the
operations of the other two government branches is one of its most potent weapons. It is a useful weapon with which to ward off a despotic
Executive. Nevertheless, it can be, and often is, abused. This Article has
asked whether there are any constitutional limitations, grounded in the
notion of separation of powers, on Congress's ability to effectuate substantive policy changes through limitation riders on appropriations bills,
and has arrived at a number of conclusions.
First, in many situations, Congress's ability to legislate through the
use of appropriation riders is subject only to the specific constitutional
safeguards that circumscribe all government action. Second, Congress
may not interfere with the Executive's ability to execute the law. Appropriations riders that attempt to influence executive discretion in the area
of law enforcement prevent the executive branch from carrying out its
constitutionally mandated activities. Third, in the realm of foreign relations, Congress is limited to doing what it does best, and must not attempt to interfere when the President is better situated and equipped to
assess all relevant options. Finally, Congress should avoid enacting substantive policy changes through appropriations riders. When Congress
chooses to legislate in this manner, the President should refuse to abide
by funding limitations he or she considers to be unconstitutional. In this
way the two branches will arrive at a confrontation where the question of
the constitutionality of the appropriations rider at issue will receive a
definitive answer.

